On April 26th, Congressional Democrats sent a clear anti-war message to President Bush by passing an Iraq War funding bill that stipulated a phased withdrawal of US troops by the end of 2008. The following week, Bush vetoed the bill, committing America to at least one more year of an unwinnable war. After 4 years, 320 billion dollars, and over 3700 American dead, it’s time for us to go. The relevant question now isn’t what the US should do in Iraq, but what it actually can do. At this point, the chances that Iraq will develop into a stable liberal democracy sometime in the near future are close to nil. The best that America (and the Iraqi people) can hope for is a semi-autocratic, Western-bloc ally in the same vein as Jordan or Saudi Arabia, but even this unlikely. To ensure stability, the US would first have to quell the myriad insurgencies currently active in Iraq. However, history puts our troops at a disadvantage: since the beginning of the 20th century, there have been approximately 24 major guerrilla insurgencies waged against occupational powers, 15 of which were successful (63 percent). Last year, the US military finally began to adopt some of the methods employed by more successful counter-guerrilla forces in the past, but modern strategic theory holds that this is too little, too late. America’s own “Powell Doctrine”, developed as a response to the harsh lessons of Vietnam, states that modern wars can only be won through mass deployment, rapid escalation, and heavy investment in post-war infrastructure. In other words, the exact opposite of the policies pursued in Iraq. Some believe that, were US troops to withdraw, Iraq would plunge into a civil war, and Iran would extend it’s sphere of influence into Iraq’s Shiite south, possibly gaining control of the country’s oil. But Iraq already is in a civil war, with tens of thousands of casualties. And, since 2003, Iranian-sponsored Shiite religious parties have unilaterally controlled Iraq’s nine southern governates. Iranian intervention in Iraq might not be the nightmare scenario some would depict. After 9/11, Iran eagerly assisted US security efforts in the Middle East – that is, until Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. Many State Dept. diplomats even feel that Iran could be a stabilizing factor in Iraq, and allowing its intervention could be a bargaining chip for the US in negotiations on Iran’s nukes. The danger of Iranian control over Iraq’s oil is exaggerated, as well. The US purchases 45% of it’s oil from Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, only 5% from Iraq, and none from Iran. There’s no logical reason to assume that Iranian influence on OPEC would be more dangerous than previous Iraqi influence, and, as we’ve all seen recently, no reason to believe that oil prices have anything to do with actual supply. Due to Iran’s growing middle class, it’s OPEC power could be mitigated through trade leverage, and at worst, could serve as a counter-balance to Russia’s growing influence. The ugly truth is, America can’t fulfill its responsibility to the Iraqi people. Nor can it fulfill its responsibility to its own soldiers. In order to mitigate the damage and at least somehow better the situation, US policymakers must pursue the best option available to them, even if it’s not ideal. That option is phased withdrawal.