Warheads from a Russian intermediate range ballistic missile blazed through the sky over Ukraine on the night of Nov. 21. Glowing with heat as they reentered Earth’s atmosphere, the warheads rained down on the city of Dnipro which is home to over 900,000 people.
Despite the previous use of shorter range, conventional, non-nuclear, ballistic missiles in the Ukraine war by both Russia and Ukraine, this attack continues a dangerous precedent of normalizing nuclear brinkmanship set by Russia.
A Pentagon spokesperson confirmed that the missile strike was announced through nuclear deconfliction channels, albeit briefly so. However, it still risks being mistaken for a nuclear strike which would, in turn, cause a nuclear strike from NATO-aligned nations in retaliation of the perceived threat.
Russian president Vladimir Putin has claimed the strike was in response to an attack on Bryansk, which the Russian ministry of defense claimed was made by Ukraine using U.S. and UK furnished missiles just two days after President Biden signed an authorization for Ukraine to strike deeper into Russian territory on Nov. 17.
In his statement, Putin claimed the missile used to strike Ukraine was a new experimental IRBM, and threatened nuclear escalation against the west if NATO aligned nations continue to arm Ukraine. While not the first time Putin has inflamed nuclear tensions over the Ukraine war, doing so after the first combat use of a ballistic missile with a range greater than 3,000 km and carrying multiple independent reentry vehicles (warheads), also known as a MIRV, is a dramatic escalation in the nearly two year conflict.
This strike drastically changes the tone for the Ukraine war, with a message of capability particularly aimed at intimidating Western Allied powers. Historically intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles have played an almost exclusively nuclear role, thanks to their long range allowing strikes on capital cities and major population centers thousands of kilometers from their launch site.
The full extent of the fallout from this dramatic increase in tensions is yet to be known. While the current Biden administration has maintained a handle on the conflict, the incoming Trump administration is likely to be far more volatile, which could act to encourage more aggressive responses from Russia and potentially edge the world closer to a nuclear crisis.
A willingness by Russia to launch a MIRV carrying IRBMs in a combat scenario signals a wider willingness to risk a nuclear conflict in an attempt to sequester NATO aid to Ukraine. Russia’s crushing losses during the Ukraine conflict has pushed its leadership to more aggressive tactics as they run out of things to lose.
This is classic nuclear brinkmanship, and echoes the chain of escalations that brought the world to the brink during the Cuban missile crisis. Further, the use of a missile test to strike a target in an active military conflict muddies the waters of nuclear conflict, and pushes the internationally agreed-upon legal frameworks for war to their limits.
Launch on Warning
Intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles take 30 minutes or less to reach their target thanks to the great speeds needed to propel their warheads through space and across thousands of kilometers. This leaves a very short window to detect and classify the threat to determine if a nuclear response is warranted.
The danger here is twofold; firstly, due to the limited time to respond and the “launch on warning” policy, that western powers will be unable to know whether a missile is actually carrying a nuclear warhead or not until it makes impact or is shot down by an interceptor, and may launch a nuclear response if the missile is believed to be a nuclear strike.
Even if the test is announced beforehand, as this one was, even if on extremely short notice, use in a combat scenario risks a miscommunication and a nuclear retaliation. While it has never resulted in a nuclear strike, miscommunications and false alarms have happened in the past, resulting in multiple nuclear close-calls.
One such incident took place on Jan. 25, 1995 when a high altitude scientific rocket launched from Norway to study the aurora borealis was mistaken by Russian early warning radar crews as a possible nuclear missile attack. Russian leadership had 10 minutes to make a decision on launching a nuclear retaliation.
Eight minutes after the launch, the rocket was identified not to be a nuclear missile and radar crews observed it fall into the sea. After the incident it was revealed that Russia had been notified of the launch weeks beforehand. However the message never made it to the radar crew.
While it did not result in a mistaken nuclear strike, incidents like these are not small in number and serve to highlight how a simple miscommunication could lead to the outbreak of nuclear war.
Range Matters
Ballistic missiles are classified by their capabilities, primarily by their range. Missiles with a range of greater than 5,000 km are known as an intercontinental ballistic missile, with a range of between 3,000 and 5,000 km they are known as intermediate range ballistic missiles, and below that are medium range and short range ballistic missiles, MRBMs and SRBMs respectively.
While this distinction may seem trivial, it plays a significant role in arms control and largely dictates whether different missiles are likely to play a significant nuclear role.
Shorter range MRBMs and SRBMs have a long history of use in modern warfare, from Iraqi Scuds in the First Gulf War, to recent missile attacks launched by Iran against Israel.
ICBMs and IRBMs, however, have almost no history of conventional use, and up to this point have acted as a nuclear deterrent. That is to say, a nuclear missile that can be launched in the event of an incoming nuclear strike is intended to deter a nuclear first strike, and it would mean both nations, the launcher and the intended target, would end up being struck by nuclear weapons.
To help ease nuclear tensions in Europe, various arms reduction treaties were put in place, limiting the number of multi-megaton warheads, ICBMs and outlawing the construction and deployment of IRBMs. Russia has since pulled out of multiple treaties including the SALT II treaty which aimed to limit the number and size of nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. and Russia.
The U.S. said Russia has violated other treaties with their proliferation of IRBMs. Thanks to their shorter range, IRBMS have a shorter time to reach their target than longer range ICBMs.
The path forward is more investment into nuclear deconfliction and increased diplomatic pressure on Russia to re-enter nuclear non-proliferation treaties to help ease growing nuclear tensions and end this dangerous game of gambling with nuclear annihilation.
One strategy the U.S. may be able to use is attempting to persuade other nuclear powers, China and India in particular, to join these treaties. This would exert a considerable level of diplomatic pressure on Russia to sign on to these treaties as Russia has diplomatic and economic ties to these nations.
Unfortunately, with the state of continuing escalations in the Russia-Ukraine war, this seems increasingly unlikely as Russia’s desperation grows.
